RATIONALIZATION, EVIDENCE, AND PRETENSE

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Abstract

In this paper I distinguish the category of “rationalization” from various forms of epistemic irrationality. I maintain that only if we model rationalizers as pretenders can we make sense of the rationalizer’s distinctive relationship to the evidence in her possession. I contrast the cognitive attitude of the rationalizer with that of believers whose relationship to the evidence I describe as “waffling” or “intransigent”. In the final section of the paper, I compare the rationalizer to the Frankfurtian bullshitter.

The concept of rationalization, in the sense of biased post-hoc self-justification, has come to play a crucial theoretical role in recent empirically-minded moral psychology. Dan Ariely (2012) identifies rationalization the engine of interpersonal dishonesty. It is our capacity to rationalize that enables us to benefit from dishonesty and simultaneously to think of ourselves as honest people. Jonathan Haidt (2001) maintains that people habitually construct reasonable sounding justifications for morally important choices while their real motives remain hidden to them. Indeed, Haidt contends that most moral reasoning is post-hoc: we decide what is wrong or right based on emotionally driven intuitions, and then we make up “reasons” to explain and justify our decisions. Joshua Greene (2007) concurs with Haidt that much of what passes for moral reasoning is in fact rationalization, and maintains that deontology is worse of than consequentialism in this regard.

Considering the central theoretical role that rationalization plays in much of this work, there has been surprisingly little sustained philosophical attention to characterizing it precisely and exploring its normative dimensions. How should we draw the distinction between reasoning and rationalizing? How much latitude do rationalizers have in arriving at their desired conclusions? Are rationalizers in the business of forming beliefs at all? What epistemic threat do rationalizers pose to us?

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In this paper I work toward answering these questions by examining the relationship of the cognitive attitudes of the rationalizer to the evidence that he possesses. I review two contrastive cases described by Adam Elga (2005), one in which a thinker’s belief is *entirely unconstrained* by evidence, and one in which a thinker’s belief *oscillates* between being constrained and unconstrained, depending on whether the thinker is paying attention. I dub these figures “the intransigent” and “the waffler” respectively, and briefly remark on the distinctive forms of irrationality they exhibit. I then introduce a third figure who complicates the picture. This figure, “the rationalizer” arrives at his conclusions via a process that is *continuously partially constrained* by his appraisal of the evidence. I construct a model that explains how such a relationship to the evidence is possible. This model hinges on a hypothesis that the rationalizer *makes as if* he is guided in deliberation by the norm of truth, but is in fact constrained only indirectly by the norm of truth. I maintain that only if we model rationalizers as *pretenders* can we make sense of the characteristic features of rationalization. In the final section of the paper, I compare the rationalizer to the Frankfurtian bullshitter.

I. Waffling and Intransigent Believers

Adam Elga (2005) relates that his friend, Daria, believes in astrology. Even worse, she clings to her belief in defiance of the evidence. For an epistemologist, such a friendship cannot be uncomplicated. Cases like Daria’s bring us to question how far a thinker’s beliefs may stray from her considered judgement of what the evidence supports.

Elga relates how he confronted his friend Daria with evidence that her belief in astrology was unfounded, bringing to her attention reputable studies showing that the position of distant stars at the time of one’s birth has no consequence for one’s personality or for one’s prospects. Daria conceded the weightiness of the evidence against her belief and she was unable to find any contrary evidence to support her belief. But ultimately, Daria stuck to her guns: ‘I still believe in astrology just as much as I did before seeing the studies’. And her reason? ‘Believing in astrology makes me happy’ (115).

Elga relates that he was ‘floored’ at Daria’s response (115). Before being confronted with the evidence, her pattern of belief
formation, though irrational, was at least familiar. Elga had supposed that she was unconsciously biased in favor of it, attending more closely to astrological predications that came out right than to those that came out wrong. But he had assumed that at a minimum she must form her belief in astrology based on considerations that appeared to her at the time to support such a belief.

What Elga finds truly perplexing (and also infuriating) is that Daria refuses to revise her belief even after taking stock of the overwhelming evidence against it. He maintains that Daria knowingly violates the following norm of rationality:

(E) One ought not to have beliefs that go against what one reasonable thinks one’s evidence supports. (116)

According to Elga, violating (E) is deeply irrational. Nonetheless he is wary of adopting an attitude of condescension too quickly. Why? Because he suspects that, despite having the conscience of an epistemologist, he himself is guilty of a similar transgression. That is, he suspects that he knowingly and persistently violates (E). Here is why. Elga has read the social psychology literature on the pervasive and powerful biases that distort self-evaluation. Furthermore, he is largely convinced by it. He thinks that social psychologists have discovered that most people are subject to persistent positive illusions about themselves. (Depressed people, on the other hand, have been found to have more accurate self-evaluations). These positive illusions, psychologists tell us, have a role in fostering increased happiness, motivation, and productivity. None of this Elga finds too surprising. Positive illusions, as long as they are not too extreme, seem to be the sorts of things that help people to get by.

Of course, appreciating the validity of this research should have implications for one’s own self-evaluations. In particular, one (epistemically) ought to re-calibrate one’s evaluations in the light of them. Elga is convinced that most people overrate themselves, and he has no reason to believe that he is an exception. So, on pain of violating (E), he (epistemically) ought to ratchet down his own self-evaluations. But alas, this does not happen.

I mouthed the words “I’m not as good as I thought I was.” But they didn’t sink in. As soon as it was time to make dinner, write a paper, or see a friend – indeed, as soon as it was time to do anything but sit in my office brooding about the positive
illusion literature – the impact of that literature on my self-evaluations completely evaporated. (119)

But is this shamefaced epistemologist really on par with a believer in astrology with respect to theoretical irrationality? The conclusion of Elga’s story, although maudlin, is not as bad as all that. Elga notes that while confronting the positive illusion evidence in moments of cool reflection, he does adjust his self-evaluations in light of the evidence. It is only when he enters the fray of ordinary life – eating breakfast, playing basketball, teaching – that the positive illusion studies get ‘shoved on the back-burner’ and the recalibrations come undone (121). This all happens without conscious awareness.

Elga characterizes this discrepancy as ‘waffling’ between two belief states, a reflective state that takes into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that does not. Although both Elga and Daria violate (E), Elga maintains that Daria’s way of doing so is epistemically more pernicious. Daria has beliefs that by her own lights go against the evidence, and this combination of beliefs persists even when she is aware of the tension. The waffler does not suffer from a pathology this grave. In his reflective state, he brings his beliefs in line. As such, at least we can say of him that he is disposed to properly resolve the tension between belief and evidence in the moments when he pays attention. At no time does Elga both recognize that he is violating the norm and persist in violating it. Daria, on the other hand, is in continuous violation of the norm, even when such violation is brought into focus.

I think Elga’s remarks on the irrationality of each figure are plausible, but there is one sense in which Daria is better off than Elga. Although Daria is inconsistent in the sense that her beliefs are incompatible with her assessment of the evidence, she is consistent in the sense of there being uniformity between her reflective beliefs and her non-reflective beliefs. It is an unfortunate fact about Elga that from the point of view of his own reflective self he has irrational beliefs about himself most of the time. This is an infelicitous estrangement. Although we might describe Daria as ‘alienated’ in the sense that she is unable to adduce relevant reasons for her own belief, she is not alienated in the straightforward sense that Elga is.¹ When it comes to self-evaluation, there

¹ I owe this point to P.D Magnus.
are ‘two Elgas’. Consequently, a spectator’s assessment of what Elga believes about himself may vary depending on whether he catches Elga in a reflective or a non-reflective moment. Such is not the case with Daria. Her belief in astrology is steady and unvarying.

II. Deliberative Exclusivity

While the phenomena that Elga relates are entirely familiar, one might respond with scepticism regarding whether Daria really believes in astrology despite her insistent avowal. Of course, ‘S believes in x’ where x ranges over comprehensive theories or world-views is a tricky thing to interpret. Most straightforwardly, someone who believes in astrology might think that an astrologist’s predictions of the future based on an individual’s birth sign are highly reliable. Alternatively, she could think that ‘there is some validity’ to the predictions of the best astrologers, but the nature of the ‘validity’ she refers to may be hopelessly under-specified. Finally, the believer in astrology could think that astrological understanding of human temperament ‘gets at something deep’ about man’s connection to the cosmos, a very vague belief whose truth conditions are devilishly difficult to make precise. With some probing we are not unlikely to find that the astrology advocate himself ‘waffles’ between these different interpretations, allowing him to duck commitment by changing the subject when challenged.

But even if we fix on a clear interpretation of ‘believing in astrology’ and we assume that Daria believes in astrology in that sense, we might still be reluctant to say that Daria really has this belief if she clings to it despite reviewing and appreciating the overwhelming evidence against it. Perhaps the robust phenomenon of deliberative exclusivity in doxastic deliberation underwrites our scepticism.\(^2\) The phenomenon is this: it seems that a thinker cannot in full consciousness decide whether to believe that \(p\) in a way that issues directly in forming a belief by adducing anything other than considerations that she regards as relevant to the truth of \(p\). In the philosophical debate over the “aim of belief” a rare

\(^2\) I borrow the term “exclusivity” from Steglich-Petersen (2009). Is discuss rationalization and the scope of exclusivity in D’Cruz (forthcoming).
point of agreement between normativists (who hold that it is a conceptually constitutive normative feature of beliefs that they ought to be true), teleogists (who hold that belief aims at truth in the psychological sense that beliefs are intended by agents or regulated by sub-personal mechanisms to be true), and skeptics (who hold that various formulations of the aim thesis are false or platitudinous) is that from the perspective of first personal doxastic deliberation, only considerations that appear to subject as relevant to the truth of the proposition being considered can have any influence on the deliberative outcome. Indeed, the many of participants in the contemporary debate take it as an important desideratum that their theories account for this aspect of the phenomenology of doxastic deliberation. When I deliberate about whether to believe that \( p \), it makes no difference what I feel I morally ought to believe, nor what practical aims I might have, nor what it would be most pleasant to believe. From this perspective, whether to believe a proposition is exclusively a matter of whether the proposition is true.

Exclusivity is widely accepted among philosophers. Even pragmatists who maintain that there are non-evidential reasons for belief deny that we ever explicitly evaluate the rationality of our beliefs in terms of how well they promote our goals: ‘Offering you a million dollars to believe that the earth is flat may convince you that you have a good economic reason to believe the proposition, but in itself it won’t be enough to persuade you that the earth is really flat.’ (Foley 1993,16)

By adducing the consideration ‘believing in astrology makes me happy’ and thereby arriving at the conclusion ‘astrology is true’ Daria appears to violate deliberative exclusivity. Such violation is surely very rare – we might even doubt that it is possible. And this gives us pause in attributing the belief to Daria. But is deliberative exclusivity hegemonic? Huddleston (2011) offers a case, rather similar to that of Daria, as a counter-example:

Mary, let us say, believes that there is a God. Yet Mary is a particularly self-conscious religious believer. For she also believes she has no evidence for this belief. And furthermore she is consciously aware of her own lack of evidence.

Nonetheless, she still believes that there is a God. Is it really inconceivable that there could be a person with this belief and this belief about her evidence? Surely not. Indeed, I think I know people like this. (211)

Huddleston concedes that if a person believes he lacks necessary evidence or appreciates conclusive contrary evidence it is typically the case that he must push such beliefs out of his conscious awareness in order to continue believing. But he contends that this need not always be the case. Huddleston dubs this small subset of atypical beliefs “naughty beliefs” – beliefs that are recalcitrant in the face of epistemic authority. Superstitious beliefs are among his paradigm examples.

I think that it is still a live question whether we ought to classify the attitudes described by Elga and Huddleston as beliefs, and it is not my aim in this paper to settle the question. But we are at least now in a position to articulate two competing accounts of the kind of mistake that Daria is making. We might think, following Elga and Huddleston, that Daria is irrational in that she believes that $p$ despite the fact that she thinks that the evidence supports $\neg p$. Or else, we might think that Daria’s irrationality consists in her inability to accurately introspect or to accurately report her own beliefs. (Alternatively, if we are feeling uncharitable, we may think that Daria is not being sincere and that her putative belief is merely a rebellious posture.)

For my purposes, it is not required that we decide which of these interpretations of Daria is most apt. The important thing to note is that Elga’s distorted belief in his own ability invites none of this brand of scepticism. Elga’s pattern of belief formation is altogether congruent with deliberative exclusivity. It is only in non-deliberative contexts that Elga fails to recalibrate his belief to account for the relevant evidence. This kind of disparity in truth-regulation between deliberative contexts and non-deliberative contexts has been remarked on elsewhere. In discussing the standard case of the self-deceived cuckolded husband, Nishi Shah (2003) contends that ‘if the husband turns his mind to the question whether to believe that his wife is faithful, then the concept of belief engages his thought, directing him to accept a proposition about his wife’s fidelity only if he can discern its truth.’ (473) Contrariwise, Shah contends that if the husband ‘never bothers to ask himself this question, however, then he may very well be induced by wishful thinking or other non-evidentially sensitive
processes to be in a state of mind that, third-personally, we would judge to the belief that his wife is faithful.’ (473) We may aptly dub the phenomenon that Shah describes as a kind of ‘counterfactual waffling’. It may never be that case that this man turns his mind to the question whether to believe that his wife is faithful. But were he to ‘doxastically deliberate’, then he his belief would be regulated so as to conform to his appraisal of the evidence.

III. Enter the Rationalizer

In what follows, I introduce a new figure who complicates this picture, but whose troubled relationship to the evidence is just as familiar as that of Daria and Mary, the intransigent believers (or ‘believer’ if the reader prefers), and Elga, the waffling believer. This figure is unlike Elga, whose oscillation between theoretical rationality and irrationality tracks his relative attention or inattention to the evidence. Elga cares about the truth and worries that his beliefs might diverge from it. The figure I will describe displays no such oscillation, and no such devotion to the truth. At the same time, this individual is not endowed with Daria and Mary’s breezy indifference to obvious and decisive countervailing evidence. Unlike Daria and Mary, the rationalizer presents himself as genuinely concerned with following the evidence where it leads. He has a more complicated relationship to the evidence which presents us with a distinct category.

I maintain that when a thinker is rationalizing, the way that he reaches his conclusion is characterized by continuous partial regulation by his appraisal of the evidence (in sharp contrast to the oscillating full regulation of wafflers). As an illustration, consider the following imagined train of thought from Fred, whose paper has been rejected from a prestigious journal. When he gets around to reading the written feedback, he finds to his dismay that the comments he receives rehearse in painstaking detail all the reasons why his paper is not up to snuff. He asks himself, ‘Do the reviewers comments establish that my paper is unworthy?’ In response to the charge that his thesis is not substantiated, he tells himself that his work is just too heterodox and creative. Faced with the criticism that he fails to engage the relative literature, he insists that the expectation that he read everything is simply unreasonable. He postulates that the referees are conservative, that they...
are intellectually lazy, that they don’t want to understand, or even worse, that they plan to steal the ideas for themselves.

Notice that Fred, unlike Daria, does feel required to reckon with the available evidence. He does not arrive at their conclusion ‘arbitrarily’ or ‘at will’. In fact, the considerations that he adduces may well address the reviewers’ litany of complaints head-on. Furthermore, it is never guaranteed that he will reach the conclusion he wants: concocting an account that sounds plausible is essential. As a result, he would never say, as might Daria, that he believes his paper is worthy because this belief makes him feel happy. On the contrary, he would mostly likely present himself as an ally of Elga, heartily endorsing the principle that one ought not to have beliefs that go against what one reasonable thinks one’s evidence supports.

Notice also that Fred displays none of the waffling that we saw in Elga’s self-evaluations. Fred’s fervent avowal of his paper’s worthiness does not evaporate after he brings into focal awareness all of the powerful reasons that others advance for thinking that his work is unworthy of publication. This close attention does not (even temporarily) shake him of his professed view. As a result, Fred is also unlike the ‘counterfactual waffler’ for whom doxastic deliberation is a latent truth serum. Upon assessing the evidence in deliberation, he proceeds to smoothly explain it away.

IV. Rationalizers as pretenders

Perhaps we ought to feel pity for Fred. But even if we are sympathetic, we may also feel something better expressed by a disdainful rolling of the eyes. I think that this feeling of contempt is best explained by our deep suspicion that people like Fred know very well that the considerations they adduce in ‘deliberation’ do not in fact establish the conclusions they reach. We would not be at all surprised, for example, if Fred avoids discussing this matter with honest friends and colleagues who would quickly debunk their rationalization. Indeed, the very structure of the rationalization he constructs is designed to evade easy debunking. Fred is not altogether naïve, nor is he deluded. But then how does he manage to reach his conclusions in the light of deliberative exclusivity? Is he like like Daria who knows that the evidence does not support her belief in astrology?
Rationalizers deploy a distinctive repertoire of strategies to reach their desired conclusions. A common tactic is to adduce considerations that have only the appearance of relevance to the deliberative question. We might call these ‘pseudo-reasons’. This deft form of obfuscation gives the rationalizer’s account the outward semblance of reasoned argument. Alternatively, the rationalizer may adduce considerations that are in fact relevant to the question at hand, but proceed to give them undue weight or present them as conclusive reasons even though he knows they are not conclusive. Finally, the rationalizer may support his conclusions with empirical claims that are difficult to verify or to falsify.

What all of these strategies have in common is that they inculcate the appearance of sound reasoning while still affording the desired flexibility in the outcome of deliberation. Furthermore, all of these strategies serve to protect the rationalization from being quickly and easily debunked. Our contemptuous rather than exculpatory attitude suggests that rationalization is something that rationalizers do, not merely an infelicitous influence on their belief-forming mechanisms that befalls them. Finally, it’s not quite right to say that Fred deliberated badly; he do not really deliberate at all. Fred make as if he is deliberating, even though his ‘deliberative conclusion’ has been settled before any ‘weighing of reasons’.

As with the case of explicit fictions, being ‘realistic’ helps with the suspension of disbelief. The story told cannot be wildly implausible, far-fetched, or manifestly self-contradictory. (Fred cannot maintain that his paper was rejected because he chose the font ‘Garamond’, or because the reviewer is both jealous and not jealous). Such a rationalization would be unstable and vulnerable to easy debunking. Just as reader of a novel may ‘pop out’ of story whose plot is obviously incoherent, so also a thinker will not be moved by a rationalization that lacks the basic discursive moves characteristic of honest inquiry.

In paradigm cases rationalizers make as if they are guided by aim of truth (believe \( p \) only if \( p \)), when in fact they are guided a related, but distinct aim, that of plausibility. The aim of plausibility requires that the considerations that rationalizers adduce in support of their conclusions have the appearance of constituting sufficient reason, and it is compatible with the knowledge that the considerations do not in fact establish the relevant conclusion.\(^6\)

\(^6\) See Audi (1985) p. 163. Audi plausibly analyzes rationalizations of past actions as "purported accounts".
Rationalization is thus the negotiation of two compatible but interacting aims: the aim of reaching a conclusion that is for whatever reason desirable, and the aim of getting there with a story that is plausible. These aims, taken individually, are in some instances pursued sub-optimally. It may be the case that the rationalizer is unable to construct a sufficiently plausible account that leads to the conclusion that is most desirable.

My target phenomenon of rationalization may strike readers as redolent of a more widely discussed philosophical puzzle – that of self-deception. A sophisticated deflationist account of self-deception due to Al Mele (2001) explicitly takes on cases involving protracted doxastic deliberation on the part of the self-deceivers. Appealing to the empirical work of James Friedrich and Yaacov Trope, Mele analyzes this deliberative self-deception in terms of the asymmetric treatment of supporting and threatening data in the process of motivationally biased hypothesis testing. The person who ponders whether it is the case the \( p \) and tests her hypothesis that \( p \) tries to avoid error costs, i.e. expected costs caused by believing that \( \sim p \) when it is the case the \( p \) (Mele 2001, 31–46).

The error costs can be asymmetric in the sense that a person may incur more costs by believing falsely that \( p \) than by believing falsely that \( \sim p \). When this occurs, the person will adopt a different confidence threshold for accepting her hypothesis and for rejecting her hypothesis. The basic principle is that the ‘lower the threshold, the thinner the evidence required to reach it.’ (34) According to the theory, biased hypothesis testing is responsible for the fact that in deliberation a subject often arrives at beliefs that are consistent with her desires. Notably, Mele’s deflationist account does not require that self-deception is intentional, nor does it suppose that the self-deceived subject holds the true belief. Mele’s account only requires that the body of evidence possessed by the subject at the time of entering into self-deception provides greater warrant for \( P \) (the true belief) than for not-\( P \) (the false belief).

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7 Tamar Gendler (2008, 2010) defends a pretense account of self-deception that I find persuasive. She does not explore the topic of rationalization.

8 Intentionalists about self-deception object that deflationist accounts fail to distinguish wishful thinking (which is non-intentional) from self-deception (which is intentional) (e.g., Bermúdez 2000). Non-intentionalists respond that what distinguishes wishful thinking from self-deception is that self-deceivers recognize evidence against their self-deceptive belief whereas wishful thinkers do not (Bach 1981; Johnston 1988), or that self-deceivers merely possess, without recognizing, greater counterevidence than wishful thinkers (Mele 2001).
Deflationist accounts of self-deception capture important and interesting facets of our mental lives, and that they aptly model pervasive forms of motivationally biased belief formation. But it would be a mistake to assimilate rationalization to motivationally biased hypothesis testing. The motivationally biased doxastic deliberator aims at true belief, even when the course her deliberation is distorted by her desires. In contrast, rationalizers have most often already set upon their ‘conclusion’ before the mock-deliberative process even begins. Ted never in fact tries to figure out whether his paper was justly rejected; he merely pretends to be figuring this out. What rationalizers engage in is not irrationally biased inquiry, because it is not inquiry at all. Rather, it is pretend inquiry, a kind of performatively pretense that is constrained by the evidence only indirectly. The evidential constraint issues from the relationship of verisimilitude that the rationalization should bear to honest deliberation. To adopt the terminology of Stephen Colbert, the rationalization must have ‘truthiness’.

V. Rationalizers and bullshitters

The figure of the rationalizer, although not much discussed in contemporary philosophy, may strike readers as nonetheless similar to a character who is better known: the Frankfurtian bullshitter. Recall that Frankfurt (1986) distinguishes between ‘telling a lie’ and merely ‘producing bullshit’. Briefly, when a person tells a lie, she deliberately tries to cause another person to believe something that she takes to be false. When a person merely produces bullshit, she misleads another person as to what she is up to. To illustrate the distinction, Frankfurt offers the example of a ‘Fourth of July Orator’ who waxes bombastic about ‘our great and blessed country, whose Founding Fathers under divine guidance created a new beginning for mankind.’ (120–21) The orator is not lying, since he is not concerned with bringing about false beliefs in his audience about the role of the deity in founding the country: he is uninterested in his audience’s

9 Theorist of psychoanalysis have explored the phenomenon of rationalization in some detail. For pioneering work, see Jones (1908) who introduces the term and Fenichel (1945) who categories types of rationalization.

10 In fact, Frankfurt proposes multiple ways of distinguishing between lies and bullshit, but I focus on this way of drawing the distinction simply because it is most relevant to my discussion of rationalization.

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historical or theological views. Rather, the orator is trying to convey a certain impression of himself as a patriotic man. The orator merely makes as if he is trying to convey information about the founding fathers. For Frankfurt, bullshitting ‘unfits’ a person for the truth by fostering an habitual indifference to it. We might think of rationalizers on the model of ‘self-bullshitters’: They are Frankfurtian bullshitters who bullshit others as well as themselves. Rationalization and bullshit both involve the use of misdirection. Bullshitters make as if they are concerned with conveying the content of what they say, when in fact they are merely trying to convey certain impression of themselves. Rationalizers make as if their aim is honest inquiry, when in fact it is often only plausibility and self-justification. Like expert rationalizers, expert bullshitters exercise skill in crafting their bullshit in such a way that it is not easily detected or debunked. Understood this way, both rationalization and bullshitting are species of what we might refer to as posturing, in the sense of taking up pose that is intended to convey a pre-determined impression. Both figures can be understood as engaging in a kind of performative pretense (although only the bullshitter requires an audience apart from himself). The bullshitter is successful if he manages to convince his audience that the posture he adopts is in fact expressive of the person he really is. The rationalizer succeeds if he is able to create vivid a representation in thought (that need not amount to belief) that makes him feel better about himself, soothes his conscience, or realizes whatever other pragmatic aim he might have. 

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References

11 Thanks for useful comments from Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Bradley Armour-Garb, Tamar Gendler, Allan Hazlett, P.D. Magnus, Ron McClamrock, as well as a receptive audience at Union College, Schenectady, NY.
D’Cruz, J. (forthcoming). Rationalization as Performative Pretense. Philosophical Psychology.
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RE Query Reference 9, McHugh, C. (2011) What Do We Aim At When We Believe? Dialectica 65, pp. 327-482.

RE Query Reference 10: Should be "Steglich-Petersen" not "Steglish-Petersen".


RE Query Reference 12: As I noted above, in footnote 7, Gendler (2008) should be Gendler (2007)